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1 Introduction
In a landmark paper, Jeff Steinhauer (2016) reported the experimental observation of
Hawking radiation in an acoustic analogue black hole (or ‘dumb hole’) constructed
using a Bose-Einstein Condensate (BEC).1 This remarkable result has met with a
strangely divergent response in the physics community, varying from the assertion
that it provides ‘experimental confirmation of Hawking’s prediction’ (Jeff Steinhauer
quoted in Haaterz), to dismissal simply as ‘an amusing feat of engineering’ that
‘won’t teach us anything about black holes’ (Daniel Harlow quoted in Quanta). What
can we learn from such analogue black hole experiments? Are there circumstances
in which they can be taken to provide inductive support for conclusions about astro-
physical black holes?
In this paper we will substantially extend previous philosophical work charac-
terising analogue black hole experiments as a form of ‘analogue simulation’ (Dard-
ashti et al. 2017; The´bault 2016) via application of Bayesian confirmation theory. In
that previous analysis, emphasis was placed upon the qualitative claim that certain
‘universality arguments’ can be used to link evidence about the ‘source’ dumb hole
system to the ‘target’ black hole system. The results of this paper are quantitive in
nature and licence normatively valuable conclusions regarding the structure of such
inferences.
We first present a theorem that demonstrates how the confirmation claim can be
qualitatively characterised in Bayesian terms. The role of the universality arguments
is understood in terms of support for background assumptions that are common
between the source and target models. This means that there is a binary variable
1We should note that the Steinhauer result is novel in that it is the first clear experimental demon-
stration of quantum Hawking radiation. The earlier experiment of Weinfurtner, Tedford, Penrice, Un-
ruh, and Lawrenc (2013), using surface water waves and an analogue white hole, showed ‘classical
aspects’ of Hawking radiation. See also (Euve´, Robertson, James, Fabbri, and Rousseaux 2018).
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that can be assumed to be positively correlated with the empirical adequacy of both
the source and target models. Evidence in favour of the model of the source system
can thus be used to make inferences about the target system. Although not in-and-
of-itself a validation of the argument for confirmation via analogue simulation, the
Bayesian analysis demonstrates the internal consistency of the informal arguments
given in (Dardashti et al. 2017). Furthermore, the formal model provides a powerful
evaluative and heuristic tool for the further analysis of the structure of the inferences
involved in cases of analogue simulation. In particular, in the remains of the paper,
we present two further results that we expect will be of interest to contemporary
analogue black hole experimentalists.
Our second principal result relates to the behaviour of the confirmation measure in
the context of multiple ‘materially distinct’ experimental realisations of the analogue
system. This is of particular relevance to contemporary analogue black hole research
since the BEC experiment is expected to be the first of many diverse analogue realisa-
tions of Hawking radiation: e.g., phonons in superfluid liquid helium or ‘slow light’
in moving optical media. The immediate question in this context is how many distinct
analogue systems one needs to construct to be confident in the astrophysical effect.
The second key result of this paper is a formal model for ‘multiple source’ analogue
simulation displaying the generic feature of ‘saturation’ in confirmatory power with
an increase in the number of sources.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, there is the question of whether different
potential analogue realisations could provide different levels of confirmation. Would
we learn more about astrophysical black holes from an analogue experiment based
upon liquid helium or optical media? The third key result of the paper is a theo-
rem proving that analogue experiments in which we are more confident about the
fundamental physics (e.g. optical media) teach us less about the target system than
those about which we are less confident (e.g. liquid helium). Our results thus pro-
vide a basis to both formalise the epistemic value of analogue experiments that have
been conducted, like that of Steinhauer, and to advise scientists as to the respective
epistemic value of future analogue experiments. As such, our work demonstrates the
enduring value of the Bayesian framework as a tool for analysing the protean forms
of scientific inference.
2 Confirmation, Analogy and Experiment
The literature on analogical reasoning in science is fairly extensive, with particularly
noteworthy contributions by Keynes (1921), Hesse (1963, 1964, 1974), Bailer-Jones
(2009) and Bartha (2010, 2013).2 Typically analogical arguments have the form of
abstract speculative inferences regarding possible features of one system (‘the target’)
based on known features of another system (‘the source’). Classic examples are Reid’s
argument for the existence of life on other planets based upon life on earth (Reid and
Hamilton 1850) or Hume’s argument for animal consciousness based upon human
consciousness (Hume 1978).
2See also Norton (2011) for an importantly different take on analogical arguments. Norton’s analysis
focuses on analogical arguments that proceed via subsumption of the target system into a larger
class of entities, including the source system. There are broad parallels between the structure of such
inferences and our analysis.
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Analogical arguments evidently play an important heuristic role in scientific prac-
tice in that they provide ‘cognitive strategies for creative discovery’ (Bailer-Jones 2009,
p. 56). The epistemic role of analogical arguments in science is, however, more contro-
versial. In particular, the literature contains diverging answers regarding whether
analogical arguments can provide Bayesian confirmation of a hypothesis regarding
the target system. From a Bayesian perspective on confirmation, evidence for a hy-
pothesis can count as confirmatory only if the probability of the hypothesis given the
evidence together with certain background assumptions is larger than the probability
of the hypothesis given only the background assumptions. In a detailed and nuanced
treatment of the issue, Hesse (1974, pp. 208-19) suggests that analogical arguments
can in some cases be confirmatory in a Bayesian sense, so long as the analogical rela-
tionship that holds is in terms of what she calls a ‘material analogy’. That is, where
there is a similarity relation of sharing at least one predicate between the target and
source systems.3
Contrastingly, Bartha (2010, 2013) offers arguments that analogical arguments can-
not in principle be confirmatory in a Bayesian sense. In particular, he suggest that be-
cause the information encapsulated in an analogical argument is taken to already be
part of the ‘background knowledge’, the probability of a hypothesis regarding the
target system must be identical before and after including the analogical argument.
Bartha takes this instance of the familiar problem of old evidence (Glymour 1980)
to be significant enough to bar analogical arguments from being confirmatory in
Bayesian terms. Rather, following Salmon (1967, 1990), Bartha argues that arguments
by analogy can establish only the plausibility of a conclusion in the technical sense
of justifying the assignment of a non-negligible prior probability assignment (Bartha
2010, §8.5). On this analysis, it is not in principle possible for analogical arguments
to confer inductive support for a hypothesis. That is, although analogical arguments
can certainly be stronger or weaker, even the strongest possible analogical argument
cannot confer confirmation in a Bayesian sense: they are abstract inferences that can
only ever support plausibility claims rather than providing inductive evidence.
Although worthy and insightful, the treatments of Hesse (1974) and Bartha (2010)
do not extend to the analysis of analogue experiments. This is because analogue ex-
periments are unlike arguments by analogy in exactly the respects that are crucial for
either the Hesse or the Bartha analysis to go through. The question of whether one
agrees with Hesse or Bartha about the confirmatory power of arguments by analogy
is simply tangential to the analysis of the confirmatory power of analogue experi-
ments. In the case of Hesse, this is indicated by the fact that her notion of material
analogy is too strict to accommodate the subtle relation that the model of the target
has to the model of the source in the case of analogue experiments, such as the Stein-
hauer experiments. We are dealing with an analogue simulation that does not involve
a material analogy in the sense of Hesse since there is not a physical property com-
mon between the target and source systems. Rather than a material relation between
systems, we have a syntactic isomorphism between models.4,5
3Hesse (1974, p. 216) explicitly rules out the possibility of confirmation obtaining in cases where
there is purely a ‘formal analogy’. That is, where target and source are both interpretations of the same
formal calculus but do not share material similarities.
4Here ‘syntactic isomorphism’ is a natural generalisation of Hempel’s (1965) notion of nomic iso-
morphism to the case of a relation between models rather than laws.
5Hesse (1963), does in fact, rather presciently, consider the relevance of simulators in her account
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Bartha’s negative analysis of the prospect for confirmation via analogical argu-
ment is similarly inapplicable to analogue experiments. In this case because of the
‘experimental’ rather than the ‘simulation’ side of things. Analogue experiments, un-
like analogical arguments, are essentially empirical: they involve learning about the
world by manipulating it. In experiments, such as those carried out by Steinhauer,
we manipulate the source such that certain explicit modelling assumptions matching
those for the target obtain. Analogue simulation thus resembles a form of exper-
imentation, involving the ‘programming’ of a physical system such that it can be
used to ‘simulate’ another physical system. Thus, we see that conclusions from the
philosophical analysis of analogical argument should not be taken to be readily ex-
tendible to cases of analogue simulation in contemporary science. In particular, it
is self-evidently the case that the old evidence problem for the Bayesian analysis of
traditional arguments by analogy a` la Hesse, is not longer relevant for analogue ex-
periments. Analogue experiments unlike analogical reasoning explicitly involve the
collection of new evidence and there are not good grounds for relegating their signif-
icance to mere plausibility.
This collection of new evidence motivates us to consider the ‘epistemology of
analogue experimentation’ in parallel with the epistemology of conventional experi-
ments. As has been noted by various authors (Franklin 1989; Winsberg 2010; Franklin
and Perovic 2016)) conventional experiments are generally only of epistemologi-
cal significance when supplemented by arguments that imply that the information
learned about the system being manipulated (‘the source’) is relevantly probative
about the class of systems that are of interest to the experimenters (‘the target’). A
nice illustration of this point is provided by experiments designed to learn about the
thermal conductivity of the iron in Earth’s core (Konoˆpkova´ et al. 2016; Dobson 2016).
The experiments were carried out in the lab using samples of iron that are placed in a
laser-heated diamond-anvil cell. The pressure and temperature that the iron samples
were subjected to were specifically matched to those relevant to the cores of Mercury-
sized to Earth-sized planets. For the experiments to achieve their epistemic purpose,
they must be supplemented with arguments that the measurements are be ‘relevantly
probative’ of the thermal conductivity of iron in the core’s of Mercury-sized to Earth-
sized planets. That is, there must be a basis to generalise from the observations re-
garding the lab based system (the ‘source’), to relevant systems outside the lab (the
‘target’). In parallel, what we take to be the key question in the epistemology of ana-
logue experimentation is whether we can provide arguments that the relevant source
systems ‘stand-in’ for the target systems to which the analogical relationship refers.
Can we find arguments that the Steinhauer experiments are relevantly probative of
the thermal properties of astrophysical black holes?6
of models and analogies in science. Tantalisingly, she says that analogue machines (i.e. simulators):
‘are useful and necessary as predictive models precisely in those cases where the material substance
of parts of the analogue is not essential to the model, but where the mutual relations of the parts are
essential’ (p. 102) This connection is unfortunately not taken up in the 1974 Bayesian analysis.
6See (The´bault 2016) for an analysis of the connection between the epistemology of analogue ex-
periments and the notions of internal’ and external validation as discussed in the philosophy of ex-
perimentation.
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3 Hawking Radiation and Universality
Hawking radiation (Hawking 1975) is a thermal phenomena that is predicted to be
generically associated with black holes. Despite the absence of either a clear causal
process behind the radiation or experimental evidence, it is widely believed in by
theoretical physicists. In fact, the ability to recover Hawking radiation could even be
taken as a theoretical test of prospective theories of quantum gravity, much like the
recovery of the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for black hole entropy (Wu¨thrich 2017).
There are two connected reasons why physicists are so confident in the prediction
of Hawking radiation. First, given the Unruh effect (Unruh 1976), which associates
a temperature with acceleration, Hawking radiation seems to be directly implied by
the equivalence principle.7 Second, starting from Hawking’s original calculation a
remarkable number of different derivations of the effect have been given.8 The con-
sensus is that the effect is ‘remarkably robust’ to the addition of complicating factors
to the original derivation. The overall implication is that very general theoretical con-
straints coming from quantum field theory and general relativity (two well tested
theories) necessitate that something like Hawking radiation must exist. The purpose
of this paper is not to address the evidential import of such theoretical considera-
tions. Rather, our focus is on the potential for analogue experiments to provide con-
firmatory evidence of a form akin to conventional experiments. This notwithstanding,
questions of robustness will return to the fore in the context of a particular form of
universality argument that will be found to be central for questions of confirmation.
Before then, it will be instructive to consider the basic elements of the original Hawk-
ing derivation of a radiative flux for astrophysical black holes in comparison with
their sonic analogues.
Hawking’s analysis is performed in the context of a semi-classical approach to
gravity. That is, we consider matter as described by quantum field theory and space-
time as described by a continuous classical geometry. Crucially, although the space-
time in question can have non-trivial curvature, it is not coupled to the quantum
field. That is, there can be no ‘back-reaction’ between the quantum matter and clas-
sical geometry. For this modelling framework to be valid it is assumed that we are
considering quanta of wavelengths much larger than the Planck length. Quanta of
the order of the Planck length could be expected to ‘see’ the (presumed) non-classical
and non-continuous structure of spacetime and would necessitate a quantum theory
of gravity in their description. Quite general formal considerations can be used to
show that in the semi-classical framework the vacuum state of a quantum scalar field
defined at past null infinity need not appear as a vacuum state to observers at posi-
tive null infinity. In particular, it may contain a ‘particle flux’. What Hawking shows
in his original paper is that for spacetime in which an astrophysical black hole forms
there will be a particle flux which observers at positive null infinity will associate
with the blackhole horizon. The asymptotic form of the expression for the particles
flux is shown to depend only upon the surface gravity of the black hole denoted by
κG. Surface gravity is essentially the force per unit mass that must be applied at in-
finity in order to hold a stationary zero angular momentum particle just outside the
horizon (Jacobson 1996). Hawking’s calculation implies that a black hole has intrinsic
7Such a conclusion is, in fact, a little too quick since the equivalence principle holds only locally
and Hawking radiation is a global effect. See (Helfer 2010).
8See (Leonhardt and Philbin 2008; Thompson and Ford 2008; Wallace 2017).
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properties that are connected to a non-zero thermal particle flux at late times. The
precise relation takes the form:
〈Nˆω〉 = 1
e
2pi ω
h¯ κG − 1
with TBH := h¯ κG/2pi, (1)
where Nˆω is the number operator for modes detected at late times with frequency ω
and h¯ is Planck’s constant divided by 2pi.
One key feature of the derivation of the temperature is worth noting here since
it will be very important in what follows. In the derivation of Hawking radiation
an exponential gravitational red-shift means that the black hole radiation detected
at late times must be taken to correspond to extremely high frequency radiation at
the horizon. These ‘trans-Planckian’ modes are of wavelengths that are of precisely
the kind that we presumed to exclude in using the semi-classical framework. There
is thus a tension between the initial modelling assumptions and the details of the
calculation. We will return to this issue shortly.
Not long after the derivation of Hawking’s radiation, it was proposed by Unruh
that a similar thermal effect might exist in the context of sound in fluid systems
(Unruh 1981). In particular, Unruh showed that the key elements of Hawking’s calcu-
lation could be re-applied in the context of a semi-classical model of sound in fluids.
The role of the spacetime geometry is now played by a ‘bulk’ fluid flow as described
by continuum hydrodynamics. The role of the quantum field is then played by a
quantized linear fluctuation within the fluid, a phonon. The modelling framework
of continuum hydrodynamics is only valid provided fluid density fluctuations of the
order of molecular lengths can be ignored. So for this semi-classical description to
be adequate the wavelengths of the phonons must be much larger than the inter-
molecular distances. Unruh’s brilliant insight was to recognise that there is a special
class of analogue fluid systems for which the equations of semi-classical continuum
hydrodynamics take a form isomorphic to those of semi-classical gravity. The role of
the black hole event horizon is now played by an effective acoustic horizon where
the inward flowing magnitude of the radial velocity of the fluid exceeds the speed of
sound. The black hole is replaced by a dumb hole. Just as in the gravitational Hawking
effect a black hole event horizon is associated with a late time thermal photonic flux,
in the hydrodynamic Hawking effect Unruh showed that a dumb hole sonic horizon
can be associated with a late time thermal phononic flux.
In practice, detection of Hawking radiation in a fluid is extremely difficult and it
has not been possible to construct an acoustic analogue black hole of the type origi-
nally proposed by Unruh. Rather, an alternative medium for experimentally realisable
acoustic blackholes was proposed in terms of Bose-Einstein condensates (Garay et al.
2000). This is an exotic form of matter predicted in the 1920s (Einstein 1924; Bose 1924)
but not created experimentally until 1995 (Anderson et al. 1995). Crucially, in the limit
of weak coupling and no backreaction density fluctuations in a BEC are described by the
Gross-Pitaevskii equation. When variations in the density of the BEC occur on length
scales much greater than the healing length, the Gross-Pitaevskii equation can be used
to derive an equation of the same form as that of an irrotational fluid derived by
continuum hydrodynamics. Following the same line of reasoning as Unruh’s original
ideal fluid argument, (Garay et al. 2000) derived a BEC Hawking Effect using appeal
to this hydrodynamic approximation to a BEC.
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There are now a huge number of potential analogue realisations of the Hawking
effect: phonons in superfluid liquid helium, ‘slow light’ in moving media, traveling
refractive index interfaces in nonlinear optical media, laser pulses in nonlinear di-
electric medium.9 To realize the Hawking effect it seems it is sufficient to have: i) a
classical (effective) background with quantum fields living on it; and ii) an (effective)
geometry with an (effective) causal horizon.
A crucial feature in the derivation of all these effects is the integration over ex-
tremely high energy ‘trans-Planckian’ modes. As noted above, in the black hole case
these modes get included in the calculation due to an exponential redshift between
the horizon (where they originate) and late times (where they are detected). Such
a feature is generic to all models of Hawking radiation in which the modes orig-
inate near the horizon.10 Since the ‘trans-Planckian’ regime beyond the domain of
applicability of the semi-classical modelling framework we are using, this problem
of exponential redshift seems rather worrying. In fact, according to some, the trans-
Planckian problem is so serious as to cast doubt upon the Hawking calculation en-
tirely. Unruh, for instance, even asks that ‘if the derivation relies on such absurd phys-
ical assumptions, can the result be trusted?’ (Unruh 2014, p. 534). The problem with
‘trans-Planckian’ modes has a direct analogue in both the continuum hydrodynamic
and BEC derivations. In particular, the acoustic analogue of the gravitational redshift,
means that in both cases we are including in our calculation phonons of wavelengths
small enough to probe the regimes well beyond the inter-molecular length and heal-
ing length respectively.
Fortunately, there are good reasons to expect that the Hawking effect in both
gravitational and analogue cases will be robust to disturbance from trans-Planckian
modes. In particular, (Unruh and Schu¨tzhold 2005) have provided strong theoretical
reasons to expect that, under certain conditions, any possible modifications to the
Hawking flux by trans-Planckian modes will be negligible.11 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold
show that a wide family of trans-Planckian effects can be factored into the calculation
of Hawking radiation via a non-trivial dispersion relation. To lowest order and given
certain modelling assumptions, Hawking radiation, both astrophysical and acoustic,
is independent of the details of the underlying physics.
Following the influential account of (Batterman 2000), we can isolate two charac-
teristic features of a universality argument: i) Many different system types, with phys-
ically distinct microstructure (e.g. fluids and magnets), exhibit the same behaviour;
ii) Details of microstructure of a given token system are largely irrelevant for de-
scribing behaviour generically exhibited by members of the system type. Given this
definition, we can plausibly take the work of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold to serve as a
model for any theoretical argument towards the universality of the Hawking effect
in the sense that it gives conditions under which: i) Many different realisations of
the (analogue) black hole system, with distinct ‘trans-Planckian’ structure (e.g. black
holes and BECs), exhibit the Hawking effect; and ii) Details of ‘trans-Planckian’ struc-
9See (Philbin et al. 2008; Belgiorno et al. 2010; Unruh and Schu¨tzhold 2012; Liberati et al. 2012;
Nguyen et al. 2015; Jacquet 2018).
10It is worth noting here that whilst, the non-standard derivation of (Giddings 2016) does appear to
allow one to avoid this feature, that of (Polchinski 1995), prima facie, does not (Harlow 2016, pp. 37-8).
11For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for example (Corley
1998; Himemoto and Tanaka 2000; Barcelo´, Garay, and Jannes 2009; Coutant, Parentani, and Finazzi
2012). For philosophical discussion see (Dardashti, The´bault, and Winsberg 2017) and (Gryb, Palacios,
and The´bault 2018).
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ture of a given (analogue) black hole system are largely irrelevant for describing the
associated thermal behaviour.
There are thus plausible grounds to take the Unruh and Schu¨tzhold arguments to
refer to universality in broadly the same sense as Batterman. Nothing, however, in our
analysis will hang upon the strength of the connection between the two uses of the
word universality. That is, whether or not one thinks the Unruh and Schu¨tzhold argu-
ments establish the Hawking effect to be a ‘universal phenomena’, these arguments
can still be unambiguously understood as having the three following implications.
First, that there is a phenomenon (i.e., the thermal flux characteristic of Hawking
radiation) that is found in systems that are substantially different in their microstruc-
ture but share crucial formal features (i.e., can be modelled using a quantum fluctua-
tion propagating on a geometry with a causal horizon). Second, this phenomenon is
robust to a wide class of variations in microstructure of a particular realisation (irrele-
vance of token details). Third, this phenomenon is robust to a wide class of variations
in microstructure between different realisations (irrelevance of type details).
Together these three features comprise the precise sense of what we will mean
by a ‘universality argument for Hawking radiation’. Whilst detailed analysis of the
particular universality argument of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold, is an important task, we
will not further pursue it here. Rather, in the reminder of this paper, we will assume
the position of an agent with significant credence in some universality arguments for
Hawking radiation, and pursue the consequences for the epistemology of analogue
experimentation.
4 Bayesian Analysis
4.1 Single Source Confirmation
The key claim that we wish to investigate is the sense in which analogue ‘dumb hole’
experiments can provide inductive support for a hypothesis regarding black holes
given we believe the appropriate universality arguments. In what follows we give
a Bayesian network representation of the proposed inferential structure of analogue
simulation defended in (Dardashti et al. 2017) and show that the evidence in the
source system can provide confirmation of hypotheses regarding the target system in
certain circumstances.12
Let us start with the representation of the target system T . We denote by M a
propositional variable that takes the two values:
M: The modelling frameworkM provides an empirically adequate description of the
target system T within a certain domain of conditions DM.
¬M: The modelling framework M does not provide an empirically adequate de-
scription of the target system T within a certain domain of conditions DM.
12For models of confirmation in terms of the Bayesian framework see (Hartmann and Sprenger 2010;
Bovens and Hartmann 2004) or for the hypothetic-deductive framework see (Betz 2013). Throughout
this paper, we follow the convention that propositional variables are printed in italic script, and that
the instantiations of these variables are printed in roman script.
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The adequacy of the modelling framework T depends on whether the background
assumptions which justify the empirical adequacy of the modelling framework ob-
tain. We denote with XM the random variable with the values:
XM: The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, . . . , xnM} are satisfied for systemT .
¬XM: The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, . . . , xnM} are not satisfied for sys-
tem T .
where the second statement should be read in terms of a negation of the disjuncts. The
role of the background assumptions is to define and justify the domain of conditions
for the model. These assumptions involve knowledge, both theoretical and empirical,
that goes beyond what is encoded within the model. Such knowledge need not be in
the form of a simple, unified framework. Rather the background knowledge of the
people who build and use models can contain an incompletely integrated set of ex-
plicit and tacit ideas about when a particular modelling framework will be adequate
for a particular purpose and to a particular desired degree of accuracy.
With this in mind, we can introduce the random variables A and XA for the source
system S . Where A is a propositional variable that takes the two values:
A: The modelling framework A provides an empirically adequate description of the
source system S within a certain domain of conditions DS .
¬A: The modelling framework A does not provide an empirically adequate descrip-
tion of the source system S within a certain domain of conditions DA.
and XA is the random variable with the values:
XA: The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, . . . , xkA} are satisfied for system S .
¬XA: The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, . . . , xkA} are not satisfied for sys-
tem S .
The systems T and S are assumed to differ in terms of their material constitu-
tion and the fundamental laws governing their dynamics. This means that the back-
ground assumptions behind the models M and A can reasonably be assumed to be
very different. Given this, it is justified, prima facie, to assume that XM and XA are
probabilistically independent. Furthermore, we have assumed that the source sys-
tem is empirically accessible meaning we can gain empirical evidence regarding (at
least) some of its consequences. We can encode this by introducing a variable E corre-
sponding to the two values, E, the empirical evidence obtains, and ¬E, the empirical
evidence does not obtain.
We can represent all the variables introduced thus far as well as the probabilistic
dependencies using a Bayesian network (Bovens and Hartmann 2004). The random
variables are represented as ‘nodes’ in the network (i.e. circles) and the probabilistic
dependences as directed edges (i.e. arrows). We draw an arrow between two nodes
when the variable in the ‘parent node’ has a direct influence on the variable in the
‘child node’. Probabilistic independence is represented implicit by the absence of an
arrow between two nodes. The entire set up thus far is represented by the Bayesian
network in Figure 1.
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E
Figure 1: One source system without universality.
Consider the case of an analogue black hole experiment, leading an agent to be-
lieve E, in a context where the agent does not believe in any form of universality argu-
ment. The equations of the source model are syntactically isomorphic to the equations
that are supposed to govern the behaviour of the target model. This is somewhat sur-
prising, given that one arrives at them from different starting points (semi-classical
gravity vs. e.g. semi-classical continuum hydrodynamics) and by making different
background assumptions. However, the agent has no reason to believe that the iso-
morphism represents a deeper fact about nature: on its own, the syntactic relation
between the models gives us no reason to doubt the probabilistic independence of
XM and XA.
Now consider the same experiment performed in a context where the agent does
believe in a universality argument for Hawking radiation, as characterised in the
last section. The universality arguments give a physical justification for interpreting
the syntactic isomorphism as indicative of a deeper fact about nature. In particular,
they directly imply an inferential link between certain background assumptions of both
the model of the source system and the model of the target system. That is, while
we expect the majority of the background assumptions to remain independent, the
universality argument provides a link between some background assumptions. In this
sense evidence in favour of A may support a subset of the background assumptions
XM.
The inductive support that such an experiment would provide for M in such a
context will depend on how certain we are about the adequacy of the relevant back-
ground assumptions. If we already have strong independent grounds on which to
assign high probabilities to the the relevant background assumptions, then there is
not much added in terms of inductive support. In the context of simulating Hawking
radiation via ‘dumb holes’, the universality argument provides a link between the cru-
cial background assumption that in each case the effect is independent of influences
of the higher energy theories. Due to the trans-Planckian problem, this independence
claim is (arguably) the least well supported of the background assumptions. There is
thus a clear route for strong inductive support.
In order to make explicit calculation tractable we will subsume both the univer-
sality arguments and the common background assumptions within a single variable
X. The binary value X has the values:
X: universality arguments in support of common background assumptions hold.
¬X: universality arguments in support of common background assumptions do not
11
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E
Figure 2: Simplified network for one source system with universality arguments.
hold.
So X expresses a rather general claim, which can plausibly be assumed to be un-
certain. If we were certain about X, the inference from A to M would be blocked.
We will say more about this later. We will also subsume the remaining background
assumptions, that is those that are not addressed by X, under the nodes M and A.
Under the conditions of our assumptions, the simplified Bayesian network given
in Figure 2 will then adequately model the chain of inferences involved in analogue
simulation supported by universality arguments. We would like to show that E con-
firms M within a Bayesian theory of confirmation. This requires that one proves that
P(M|E) > P(M). For this purpose we need to specify all prior probabilities of the
‘parent node’ in the Bayesian network (i.e., X) and the conditional probabilities for
the other ‘child nodes’, given the values of their parents.
Let us simplify our notation by using the following shorthand:
P(X) =: x P(M|X) =: mx
P(A|X) =: ax P(E|A) =: ea.
The probabilities of the corresponding negated propositions are denoted with a bar,
viz. P(A|X¯) =: ax¯, P(A¯|X) =: a¯x and P(A¯|X¯) =: a¯x¯.
The first central assumption is that the prior probability of X lies in the open
interval (0, 1), however, as we discussed in Sect. 3, we have theoretical arguments, in
particular the result by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold, in favour of X. So a rational agent
would assign:
1/2 < x < 1. (2)
The conditional probabilities are then constrained by the following conditions:
mx > mx¯ (3)
ax > ax¯ (4)
ea > ea¯. (5)
The conditions (2) to (4) encode probabilistically the relevant elements of the univer-
sality arguments since they allow for the possibility of a background assumption that
supports both M and A. The statement (5) encodes probabilistically that the empirical
evidence actually plays the role of evidence in favour of the model A.
With this, the following theorem holds (the proof is in Appendix A):
Theorem 1: P(M|E) > P(M), if the conditions (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied.
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The satisfaction of Theorem 1 implies that E confirms M within a Bayesian analysis
of confirmation. Note that condition (2) is not required to prove Theorem 1.
Within the framework of analogue simulation, provided we have universality ar-
guments with prior probability that is neither unity or zero, confirmation of a hy-
pothesis regarding the target system can obtain based upon evidence relating to the
source system. It is important to note again, that having independent grounds on
which to support one of the common background assumptions will ‘block’ the in-
ductive support E can give for M as that background assumption already has a large
marginal probability. This does not pose a problem for this account but offers a way
to distinguish between those circumstances in which the novel empirical evidence E
can provide substantial inductive support for M and those circumstances it cannot be
used for that purpose.
An important implication of the Bayesian analysis relates to the role of the syn-
tactic isomorphism. The structure of the Bayesian network is such that the syntactic
isomorphism is not explicitly represented. Furthermore, based upon the network,
even if no syntactic isomorphism obtains between the modelling frameworksM and
A, one could sensibly talk about confirmation of M by E, provided there exists some
non-empty set of shared background assumptions. The key point is that in such cir-
cumstances although confirmation of M would indeed obtain, there would be no
‘analogue simulation’. As discussed above, the role of the isomorphism is to guaran-
tee that there will be a term within the modelling language ofM that is counterpart
to the term within A that refers to E . Without such a term within M there would
be no sense in which S is acting as a simulator for the behaviour of T . Although
the syntactic isomorphism is not explicitly represented in the network, it is implic-
itly stipulated within the universality argument. Furthermore, as noted above, the
universality argument is exactly the reason we take the syntactic isomorphism to
be indicative of a deeper fact about nature. Although it cannot be used to establish
confirmation, the syntactic isomorphism is a crucial, if ultimately non-fundamental,
heuristic for finding the universality argument that can.
To recapitulate, in this section we have demonstrated that confirmation via ana-
logue simulation obtains within a Bayesian analysis provided there exists an infer-
ential connection between the conditions of applicability of the target and system
models. That is, if there exists a binary variable that is assumed to be positively
correlated with the empirical adequacy of both the source and target models, then
evidence in favour of the model of the source system can be used to make inferences
about the target system. This, in-and-of-itself, is not a particularly surprising result,
and certainly the demonstration of such in principle inferential relations is not a val-
idation of the framework for analogue simulation that is being proposed. Rather, we
take the results of this section to: i) demonstrate the internal consistency of the in-
formal arguments towards confirmation via analogue simulation given in (Dardashti
et al. 2017); and ii) provide a powerful evaluative and heuristic tool for the analysis of
analogue simulation as it exists within contemporary scientific practice. Two natural
directions of further development are: i) the identification and evaluation of potential
cases of confirmation via analogue simulation in other scientific examples; and ii) the
refinement of the Bayesian model to include cases within more than one analogue
system. The second of these will be pursued in the following section.
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Figure 3: n-source system.
4.2 Multiple Source Confirmation
One important application of analogue simulation is in the context of universality
arguments. In such cases the source system is ‘multiply realisable’ in that there are
various different physical systems that can be used to implement the analogue simu-
lation. Such a notion of ‘multiply realisability’ is intended to be something more than
the variation of the material constitution of the source system. Such variation would
involve keeping fixed the ‘nomological behaviour’ of the source system but changing
the material constitution. Rather, the situation we are considering is when one varies
the modelling frameworks used to construct the analogy, and in doing so considers
equations that are syntactically isomorphic but extensionally distinct.
For example, consider again the dumb hole case. Rather than making use of the
syntactic isomorphism between BEC and gravitational models we can draw infer-
ences based upon analogue black holes constructed out of traveling refractive index
interfaces in nonlinear optical media or ‘slow light’ in moving media (Carusotto et al.
2008). This is to vary both the material constitution and the nomological behaviour
of the analogue system.
With such examples in mind, we can extend the analysis of the previous section
to consider the case when we have multiple sources each providing independent
evidence for the target system modelling framework. The expectation would be that
adding more source systems should increase the degree of confirmation, but that
this increase will eventually reach some ‘saturation point’. This matches the intuition
that, given some non-zero (or one) prior probability for the truth of the universality
arguments, a small set of different successful realisations of the source system would
be enough to provide strong evidence in favour of a hypotheses of regarding analogue
behaviour in the target system.
Consider a Bayesian network for an n-source system (Figure 3). The question we
would like to answer is how does the confirmation measure change as one increases
the number of different analogue systems providing us with evidence. Following the
same line of reasoning as the last section we assume:
a′x > a′¯x , e′a′ > e
′
a¯′ . (6)
a′′x > a′′¯x , e′′a′′ > e
′′
a¯′′ . (7)
...
a(n)x > a
(n)
x¯ , e
(n)
a(n)
> e(n)
a¯(n)
. (8)
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We can now calculate the difference measure of confirmation, which is defined as
∆(n) := P(M|E, E′, . . . , E(n))− P(M), (9)
and obtain ∆(n) > 0 (the proof is in Appendix B).
It can further be shown that (see Appendix B):
Theorem 2: ∆(n) is a strictly increasing function of the number of source
systems.
This theorem implies that as the number of different analogue systems providing ev-
idence increases so does the degree of confirmation.13 Again, this is not a particularly
surprising result. Given that confirmation via analogue simulation obtains for a single
source system, one would expect that adding in more and more (independent) source
systems would allow one to increase the degree of confirmation. The feature that is
most interesting is not the fact that ∆(n) is strictly increasing, but rather the func-
tional form of this increase. In particular, the natural intuition is that as the number
of source systems increases the increase in the degree of confirmation would eventu-
ally saturate. One of the chief virtues of the Bayesian model for analogue simulation
with multiple source systems is that it allows us to give an analytical expression for
such a saturation point.
First, let us consider how ∆(n) changes in the large n limit. A little analytical work
(again see Appendix B) allows us to show that
lim
n→+∞∆
(n) → x¯(mx −mx¯) = Nsat.. (10)
This means that the maximum amount of confirmation one can obtain by adding
in more and more sources is bounded by some finite number, Nsat., determined by
the prior probabilities x¯, mx and mx¯. Beyond this point, there is vanishingly small
added value (in terms of confirmation) achieved by adding in more source systems.
Two features of Nsat. are worth remarking on. First, the higher the prior probability
of X the lower the saturation point will be. This makes sense because the more sure
we are of X to start with, the lower the limit on the extra information we can learn
from E, E′, . . . , E(n). Second, the higher the relative likelihood of M given X to M
given ¬X (i.e. mx − mx¯), the higher the saturation point. This makes sense because
the stronger the relationship between X and M the more we can potentially learn
from E, E′, . . . , E(n).
A further interesting feature that we can examine is the speed with which the
saturation point is approached. We can examine this ‘rate of saturation’ by plotting
∆(n) for a set of prior probabilities of X.14 As can be seen from Figure 4, the higher the
prior probability of X, the quicker the saturation point is reached. Strikingly, for the
values of the parameters considered, we find that given a prior of greater than 0.5 for
X, saturation can be reached after only three or four successful analogue experiments.
13Theorem 2 does not depend on the choice of this particular confirmation measure and will also
hold if we move to another confirmation measure (Fitelson 1999).
14See Equation (23) of Appendix B. Here we have assumed for simplicity that γ(k) = c for all k with
c > 1. c measures both the likelihood of A(k) given X and the likelihood of E(k) given A(k). The stronger
the dependence of these the stronger the exponential increase of ∆(n) with n.
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Figure 4: Confirmation measure dependence and saturation point.
This result is in tune with scientific intuitions regarding analogue simulation in
the context of universality arguments. Consider, in particular the dumb hole Hawking
radiation case. There has been, thus far, only one implementation of a source system
that is reported to display the quantum Hawking effect: the Bose-Einstein condensate
experiments of (Steinhauer 2016).15 Given initial confidence in the universality argu-
ments, if another different implementation of a source system displaying the Hawk-
ing effect was achieved, that should surely radically increase the belief in the astro-
physical Hawking effect. However, once a few such examples were constructed, one
would quickly stop gaining new insight. Conversely, given initial skepticism regard-
ing the universality arguments, a second implementation of the dumb hole source
system would not radically increase the belief in the astrophysical Hawking effect.
Furthermore, in such circumstances it would only be after a diverse and extensive
range of implementations of source systems that one would stop believing that new
examples gave new information.
4.3 Confirmation Dependence on Source System
Although most of the proposed analogue models of black hole Hawking radiation
have not been tested yet, there can be significant differences in our prior belief re-
garding the adequacy of these models. One reason for this is that the modelling may
rely on a strong theoretical basis in one system but a rather conjectural basis in the
other. Another reason is that one may have good control of the experimental setup,
such that one has more reason to rely on the adequate realization of the various ide-
alizing assumptions involved in the derivation of the model. This will have as an
effect that we would assign different marginal probabilities to the analogue models.
A question thus arises, namely how do the variations in the marginal probabilities
15We should note again that the earlier experiments of (Weinfurtner et al. 2013) show classical as-
pects of Hawking radiation in an analogue system using surface waves. Modelling the inferential
relationship between the classical and quantum experiments is an interesting open question.
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one assigns to the adequacy of the analogue model affect the confirmation behaviour
of the analogue setup.
For simplicity, we will only consider the variation for the one-source model (Fig.
2). One can now show (see App. C for details and the proof):
Theorem 3: ∂∆/∂a < 0, if conditions (2) to (5) hold.
Here the derivative is taken with respect to a := P(A).
This plausible result implies that an assignment of a higher probability to the ad-
equacy of the analogue model will have the effect of a decrease in the confirmation of
the adequacy of the target model by the observation of the analogue Hawking effect.
Or to put it differently: the more certain we are about the adequacy of the model we
are experimenting on, the less effective is the evidence obtained there. Significantly,
this result has direct implications for the respective epistemic value of future ana-
logue experiments. In particular, all else being equal, it implies that scientists will
learn more by conducting future analogue experiments using media about which
we are less certain regarding the fundamental physics, than those using media about
which we are more confident.
5 Conclusion and Prospectus
History is replete with examples of ‘transformative’ technology having a profound
and lasting impact on the methodological foundations of science. Much recent lit-
erature in the philosophy of science has focused on the sense in which computer
simulation should be taken to have had such an impact.16 Analogue simulation is a
new inferential tool found at the cutting edge of modern science that we see good
reasons to take as potentially transformative. Building upon the initial analysis of
(Dardashti et al. 2017), in this paper we have applied a Bayesian analysis to explicate
the structure of inferences that analogue simulation can and cannot allow us to make.
Our three principal results are: i) that ‘single source’ confirmation via analogue
simulation can obtain under certain conditions; ii) that ‘multiple source’ confirmation
via analogue simulation displays the generic feature of saturation in confirmatory
power; iii) analogue experiments in which we are more confident about the funda-
mental physics provide less confirmation than those about which we are more con-
fident. Our results provide a basis to both formalise the epistemic value of analogue
experiments that have been conducted and to advise scientists as to the respective
epistemic value of future analogue experiments.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We consider the Bayesian network depicted in Figure 1 and have to show that
P(M|E) = P(M, E)
P(E)
> P(M). (11)
16See for example (Humphreys 1995; Humphreys 2004; Hartmann 1996; Winsberg 1999; Winsberg
2010; Parker 2009).
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The joint probability can be obtained in the following way:17
P(M, E) = ∑
X,A
P(X, M, A, E)
= ∑
X,A
P(X)P(M|X)P(A|X)P(E|A)
= x mx (axea + a¯x ea¯) + x¯mx¯(ax¯ ea + a¯x¯ ea¯)
= x mx α+ x¯ mx¯ β (12)
where we have defined
α := ax ea + a¯x ea¯ (13)
β := ax¯ ea + a¯x¯ ea¯. (14)
Similarly we obtain
P(E) = ∑
X,A,M
P(X, M, A, E)
= x α+ x¯ β (15)
and
P(M) = xmx + x¯mx¯. (16)
Defining the difference measure ∆ := P(M|E)− P(M), we need to show that ∆ is
larger than zero. After some algebraic manipulation one obtains
∆ =
x mx α+ x¯ mx¯ β− (x mx + x¯ mx¯)(x α+ x¯ β)
x α+ x¯ β
=
x¯ x (mx −mx¯)(α− β)
x α+ x¯ β
. (17)
It is easy to show that
α− β = (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯). (18)
Hence it follows that
∆ =
x¯ x (mx −mx¯)(ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯)
x α+ x¯ β
. (19)
So if (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied it follows that ∆ > 0, which needed to be shown to
proof Theorem 1.
B Proofs for n Source Systems
To see how the previous theorem can be generalized to the n source systems repre-
sented in Figure 3 let us consider first the 2-source system represented in Figure 5.
17See (Bovens and Hartmann 2004, Sect. 3.5) on the general methodology of reading joint probabili-
ties from Bayesian networks.
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Figure 5: 2-source system.
We need to show that P(M|E, E′) = P(M, E, E′)/P(E, E′) > P(M). Let us start with
the following joint probability
P(M, E, E′) = ∑
X,A,A′
P(X, M, A, E, A′, E′)
= ∑
X,A,A′
P(X)P(M|X)P(A|X)P(E|A)P(A′|X)P(E′|A′)
= x mx α α′ + x¯ mx¯ β β′, (20)
where α′ and β′ is defined identically to (13) and (14) with e and a replaced with e′
and a′.
Similarly we obtain
P(E, E′) = ∑
X,A,A′
P(X)P(E|A)P(A|X)P(E′|A′)P(A′|X)
= x α α′ + x¯ β β′. (21)
Defining ∆′ := P(M|E, E′)− P(M) it follows that
∆′ = xx¯(mx −mx¯)(α α
′ − β β′)
x α α′ + x¯ β β′
. (22)
Now α α′ − β β′ > 0 iff (α/β) · (α′ β′) > 1. This holds if α > β and α′ > β′. Both
conditions hold because of assumptions (4) to (6). Hence, ∆′ is greater than zero.
It is straightforward to generalise our discussion to the n-source system repre-
sented in Figure 3. Here we need to show that ∆(n) := P(M|E, E′, . . . , E(n))− P(M) >
0. It follows from the above consideration that
∆(n) =
x x¯(mx −mx¯)(∏nk=0 α(k) −∏nk=0 β(k))
x∏nk=0 α(k) + x¯ ∏
n
k=0 β
(k)
, (23)
with α(0) = α and β(0) = β. We have again ∆(n) > 0 once (4) to (8) are satisfied.
Let us define γ(n) := ∏nk=0 α
(k)/β(k). Since α(k) > β(k) for all k, γ(n) increases as n
increases. Furthermore, we obtain
∂∆(n)
∂γ(n)
=
x x¯ (mx −mx¯)
(x γ(n) + x¯)2
> 0. (24)
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We conclude that the amount of confirmation increases as n increases, i.e. as the
number of analogue systems providing evidence increases. Setting κ := x x¯ (mx−mx¯)
we obtain for the large n behaviour:
lim
n→+∞∆
(n) = lim
x→+∞ κ
γ(n) − 1
x γ(n) + x¯
→ κ
x
. (25)
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
C Proof of Theorem 3
We need to show how the confirmation measure (19) varies as our belief regarding
the adequacy of the analogue model varies. That is, we need to calculate
∂∆
∂a
=
∂ax
∂a
∂∆
∂ax
+
∂ax¯
∂a
∂∆
∂ax¯
+
∂x
∂a
∂∆
∂x
=
1
x
∂∆
∂ax
+
1
x¯
∂∆
∂ax¯
+
1
(ax − ax¯)
∂∆
∂x
, (26)
where we have used a := x ax + x¯ ax¯ in the last step. Taking the derivatives yields
∂∆
∂ax
=
k x x¯
(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x α+ x¯ β− (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯) x
)
,
∂∆
∂ax¯
= − k xx¯
(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x α+ x¯ β+ (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯) x¯
)
,
∂∆
∂x
=
k (ax − ax¯)
(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x α+ x¯ β− x (1 + x) α− x x¯ β
)
.
Here we have used the shorthand k := (mx−mx¯)(ea− ea¯). Plugging these expressions
into eq. (26) one obtains after some manipulation that
∂∆
∂a
=
k
(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x¯(1 + x¯) β− x(1 + x) α
)
. (27)
Assuming that (3) and (5) hold makes k positive and assuming that (2), (4) and (5)
hold makes the large bracket in (27) negative, i.e. it leads to ∂∆/∂a < 0. This com-
pletes the proof of Theorem 3.
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